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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AS APPLIED
TO POWERS OF APPOINTMENT IN MARYLAND
By LAURENCE M. JONES*
GENERAL PoLiCis GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF
THE RULE AGAINST PE= =UITIES TO POWERS
OF APOINTmENT
The rule against perpetuities is the principal restriction
on the creation of future interests. It is a rule of policy
designed to prevent the tying up of property through the
creation of remotely contingent future interests, and is part
of a broader policy of the law in favor of free alienability
and transferability.' The classic statement of the rule is
that by Gray:
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at
the creation of the interest. '2
As indicated, the rule merely prohibits the creation of
remotely contingent interests; it does not invalidate future
interests merely because they may remain future, or non-
possessory, for longer than the period allowed by the rule.
This distinction, however, has not always been recognized
in Maryland; in some early cases the Court of Appeals
expressed the view that any interest under a trust which
might continue for longer than the period allowed by the
rule against perpetuities was void.8 This view was later
* A.B. 1930, J.D. 1932, State University of Iowa; LL.M., 1933, S.J.D. 1934,
Harvard University; Professor of Law. University of Maryland School of
Law.
2See 6 AmrcoAN LAw oF PRoPRmrry (1952) §24.3; GRAY, Trnn RULE
AGATNST PERunmTrns (4th ed. 1942) §§2, 2.1; 5 Pow=u, RAL PROPERTY
(1956) §759; Srmps AqND SMrrT, FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed. 1956) §122;
4 RESTATEMENT, PRopmryrv (1944) 2119, Social Restrictions Imposed Upon
the Creation of Property Interests, Introductory Note and 2123, Part I,
The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, Introductory Note. These
frequently cited texts will be referred to hereinafter as: AM. L. PROP.,
GRAY, POWELL, Sims & SMrrn and RESTATEMENT, respectively.
2 GRAY, §201.8 Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119 (1866); Collins v. Foley, 63 Md. 158
(1885) ; Collins and Bernard v. MacTavish, 63 Md. 166 (1884) ; Albert v.
Albert, 68 Md. 352, 12 A. 11 (1888) ; Thomas v. Gregg, 76 Md. 169, 24 A.
418 (1892) ; Reed v. McIlvain, 113 Md. 140, 77 A. 329 (1910).
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abandoned, and the present attitude of the Court applying
the rule against perpetuities only to contingent interests
is in accord with generally accepted principles.4
In applying the rule against perpetuities to powers of
appointment there are certain special problems, and it is
with these the present article deals.5 First is the problem
of creating a power so that the power itself does not violate
the rule; second is the problem of the application of the
rule to the exercise of a power; third is the application of
the rule to gifts in default of appointment. In considering
these problems it is necessary to distinguish between gen-
eral and special powers, for the courts in applying the rule
against perpetuities frequently make the result depend on
how the power is classified. A power is said to be general
if the donee of the power has unlimited authority to appoint
the property to anyone, including himself or his estate.6
On the other hand, a power is clearly special if the donee
is limited in making his appointments to a relatively small
group of persons not including himself.7 These definitions
obviously do not include all possible types of powers, and
those which are not clearly general or special have been
referred to as hybrid powers. Just how such powers will be
dealt with by the courts in any particular case is difficult
to predict; sometimes, and for some purposes, the rules re-
lating to general powers are applied, while at other times,
and for other purposes, the rules governing special powers
may be applied.' In Maryland this difficulty is particularly
acute because of the peculiar interpretation which the
Court of Appeals has given to general powers. The Court
has applied a restricted interpretation to what appears to
be a broad general power and has denied the donee the
right to use property subject to such a power for the pur-
"Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 56, 89 A. 1094 (1914).
See Bettner, The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers of
Appointment, 27 Va. L. Rev. 149 (1940), for a general discussion of these
problems.
65 Am. L. PRoP. §23.12b; Simms & SMvrr, §875; 3 RF28TATEMBNT (1940)
§320; of. O'Hara v. O'Hara, 185 Md. 321, 44 A. 2d 813 (1945); Lamkin v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 64 A. 2d 704 (1949). A typical
general power of appointment gives the donee the authority to dispose of
the property "to such persons, and in such shares and amounts as he
may determine."
Ibid. Perhaps the most typical special power of appointment is the
power frequently given to a life tenant to dispose of the property "among
his children in such shares and amounts as he may determine".
G For an excellent discussion of the difficulties involved in classifying
hybrid powers, and an indication of how the courts should approach prob-
lems involving such powers, see Gold, The Claasiflcaton of Some Powers
of Appointment, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 337 (1942).
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pose of paying his debts.9 Thus in Maryland the donee,
of what on its face appears to be an unlimited power, is in
fact restricted in making his appointment in that he cannot
appoint to himself, his creditors, his estate, or the creditors
of his estate. However, for other purposes, such as the right
of the donee to create new powers when making an appoint-
ment, the Court has applied the normal rules governing
general powers.0 Therefore, it becomes important to deter-
mine how the Court of Appeals will treat general powers
when applying the rule against perpetuities.
It is also usual to classify powers according to the mode
of execution: that is, as testamentary powers or powers
presently exercisable. A testamentary power is one which
the donee may exercise only by will, while a power pres-
ently exercisable is one which the donee may exercise by
an inter vivos instrument, such as a deed, or one exercisable
either by deed or will." Most powers, apparently, are
testamentary, and a power presently exercisable is likely
to be found only in an inter vivos, or living, trust where the
donor and donee are the same person. Such powers are
reserved by the settlor when he creates the trust and are
frequently referred to as reserved powers. The fact that
the power is reserved by the donor and that he and the
donee are the same person may be an important factor in
determining what rules the courts will apply to such
powers. For example, the Court of Appeals has allowed
the settlor of a trust, who reserved the power to dispose of
the corpus, to appoint the property to his creditors for the
purpose of paying his debts. 2 It thus appears that the
Court is distinguishing between a general power which
is reserved by the donor and one which is given by the
' Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 (1888) ; Of. Connor v. O'Hara,
188 Md. 527, 53 A. 2d 33 (1947); Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
supra, n. 6. Note, Rights of Oreditors Under a Testamentary General
Power of Appointment, 4 Md. L. Rev. 297 (1940). If the power Is special
the creditors of the donee cannot reach the property subject to the power.
Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 A. 209 (1906) ; 5 Am. L. PRop. §23.15;
3 RESTATEM NT (1940) §326. Even where the power is general the creditors
of the donee, in the absence of statutes to the contrary, can only reach
the property subject to the power in those instances in which the donee has
exercised the power. 5 Am. L. Paop. §§23.16, 23.17; SiMES & SMrrH, §§944.
945; 3 RESTATEMENT (1940) §§329, 330.
10 Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., eupra, n. 6.
u Sims & SMrrH, §874; 3 RESTATEMENT (1940) §321.
"Wyeth v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 176 Md. 369, 4 A. 2d 753 (1939), noted 4
Md. L Rev. 297 (1940). See 5 Am. L. Pacp. §23.18 and 3 RESTATEMENT,
§328, 1948 Supp. (1949) 499. discussing the rights of creditors of a donee
who has reserved a general power; these authorities indicate that the rights
of creditors of a donee who has a reserved power are greater than the
rights of creditors of a donee who is merely the beneficiary of a power
granted to him by another.
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donor to another as donee; and that, for the purpose of
determining the rights of creditors of the donee, it applies
the normal rules relating to general powers to reserved
powers while applying a more restricted rule, similar to
that governing special powers, to the cases where the donor
and the donee are not the same person. The question is:
How will the Court treat reserved powers for the purpose
of the rule against perpetuities?
APPLICATION OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES TO
THE CREATION OF PowERs OF APPOINTqENT
In determining whether the donor has violated the rule
against perpetuities in creating a power of appointment, we
must consider the nature of such a power. If we think of
the power itself as an interest in property, then the power
must vest within the period allowed by the rule against
perpetuities; that is, the donee must be determined and
acquire the right to exercise the power within the per-
mitted period. Clearly any power which is so restricted
that it cannot be exercised within the period of the rule
is void.13 But, according to the traditional theory, a power
itself is not property, it is a mere authority, or agency,
given by the donor to the donee by which the latter may
transfer the title from the donor to the appointee. This
theory seems especially appropriate when applied to special
powers where the donee is limited in making his appoint-
ment to a relatively small group of persons; but as the
possible objects of the power are increased so is the donee's
authority, and in the case of a general power presently
exercisable where the donee has authority to appoint to
anyone, including himself, he is for all practical purposes
in the position of an owner. Although, according to the
traditional theory, he still does not have title, he may at
any time acquire it by exercising the power and for that
reason is frequently treated as if he were the owner.14 In
the case of testamentary powers a restriction is placed on
the exercise of the power by the donee which prevents
him from making an effective appointment prior to his
death. Thus, in the case of a testamentary power, the donee
is not in the position of an owner; this is true even though
the power is otherwise unlimited. It is, therefore, apparent
1' 6 Am. L. PROP. § §24.31, 24.32; GRAY, §474.1; 5 PowEL, §786; SimEs &
SMim, §1272; 4 RESTATEMENT (1944) §390.
11 This is especially true in the case of succession and estate taxes which
now frequently treat the donee of a general power as if he were the owner
of the property subject to the power and tax him accordingly.
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that except in the case of a general power presently exer-
cisable, the donee of a power of appointment is not in the
position of an owner of the property subject to the power;
and until the power is exercised, the property is effectively
tied up within the policy of the rule against perpetuities.
The rule, therefore, is that in the case of special powers
presently exercisable and all testamentary powers, whether
general or special, the power must be limited in such a
manner that it is certain to be exercised within the period
allowed by the rule against perpetuities from the time the
instrument creating it takes effect or it is void.'5 On the
other hand, in the case of general powers presently exer-
cisable, if the power is limited in such a manner that it
may be exercised within the period allowed by the rule
from the time of its creation it is a valid power.'6
Although there are no Maryland cases which deal
directly with the application of the rule against perpetuities
to the creation of an original power of appointment as dis-
tinguished from the validity of the exercise of the power,
the cases raising the latter question, by implication, recog-
nize the validity of a power of appointment which is so
limited that it is certain to be exercised within the period
allowed by the rule. Those cases all involve testamentary
powers, both general and special, which are so limited that
they must be exercised, if at all, by the will of the donee;
the powers, therefore, cannot extend beyond the lifetime
of a person in existence at the time the power was created
and are valid within the principle of the rule, stated above,
regarding testamentary powers. 7 There are in addition
three early cases, which, although they were decided under
the former rule that trusts which might extend beyond the
period of the rule against perpetuities were invalid, shed
some light on the problem of the creation of powers. In the
first case, Barnum v. Barnum,' the testator left certain
property in trust for a period which might extend beyond
the time allowed by the rule against perpetuities and ex-
1B 6 Am. L. PROP. §24.32; Simms & SmrTH, §1273; 4 RmSTATEMMNT (1944)
§390 (2).M6 Am. L. PROP. §24.31; Simms & SMITH, §1273; 4 RESTATEMENT (1944)
§390 (1).
"'Albert v. Albert, 68 Md. 352, 12 A. 11 (1888); Thomas v. Gregg, 76
Md. 169, 24 A. 418 (1892) ; Graham v. Whitridge. 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609,
58 A. 36 (1904) ; Reed v. McIlvain, 113 Md. 140, 77 A. 329 (1910) ; Levenson
v. Manly, 119 Md. 517, 87 A. 261 (1913) ; Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563,
89 A. 1094 (1914) ; Hawkins v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 A. 212 (1928). In
none of the above cases was any question raised regarding the validity of
the creation of the power of appointment.
126 Md. 119 (1866).
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pressly authorized the trustee to lease the property. The
Court, in holding that the trust and the power to lease were
both void, said:
"The general principle is, that every power, the
direct object of which is to create a perpetuity, is abso-
lutely void .... The exceptions to the rule .. .arise
out of the distinctions between general and limited or
special powers. But in every case, the execution of the
power, being distinct from the power itself, must con-
form to the requisition of the rule against perpetuities,
or run the hazard of being avoided. And where a power
is itself valid, in not transgressing the rule, the donee,
in executing it, may go beyond the proper boundary."' 9
Here is a definite recognition by the Court that the rule
governing the creation of powers differs from that deter-
mining the validity of the exercise of a power by the donee,
and further that there may be a distinction between the
rules governing general, or unlimited, powers on the one
hand and special, or limited, powers on the other. In the
Barnum case the power, being a limited power to lease the
property, which might extend beyond the period allowed
by the rule against perpetuities, was held invalid. This is
analogous to a special power presently exercisable which,
according to the rule previously stated, must be so limited
that it is certain to be exercised within the period of the
rule. In two other cases the validity of powers to lease
were also considered; in both cases the powers were upheld
and the Barnum case distinguished because the powers
were so limited that they could be exercised only within
the lifetimes of persons named in the instruments creating
the trusts or within the period of twenty-one years
thereafter.2
In the recent case of Lamkin v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co.,21 the Court of Appeals was presented with the question
whether the donee of a power of appointment may create
new powers when making an appointment. In that case the
donor left property in trust for his wife for life with a gen-
eral testamentary power in the wife to dispose of the corpus;
when the donee died she exercised the power by creating a
trust for her sister for life with a general testamentary
power in the sister to dispose of her share of the corpus.
Ibid 172-3.
20 Collins v. Foley, 63 Md. 158 (1885) ; Collins v. MacTavish, 63 Md. 166
(1885).
"192 Md. 472. 64 A. 2d 704 (1949).
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The sister subsequently left a will by which she exercised
the power in favor of various named persons, including her
husband. The Court held the appointments by the sister
valid, and in answer to the argument that if donees were
allowed to create new powers this might be continued in-
definitely, thus tying up the property forever, said:
"The answer to this contention is simply that no ap-
pointee can grant a further power of appointment
which may be exercised or which may create estates
commencing beyond the period prescribed by the rule
against perpetuities, counting from the death of the
original donor. Whether any subsequent power violates
the rule, depends on what might be the situation in
these respects. Such a question, as to the estates created
under a subsequent power, can be determined only
when that power is exercised, which, in this case, is at
the death of [the donee]. Her appointments did not
violate the rule against perpetuities, and therefore we
find no merit in the appellant's contention as applied
to this case. If the contention were upheld that the
question must be determined as of the time of the origi-
nal will, it would mean that no testamentary power of
appointment would ever be valid, because in no case
could it be said that some donee might not, in the exer-
cise of the power, fix the time of the vesting of an estate
which he could appoint to a time beyond the duration
of lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter."22
Although the case deals primarily with the problem of dele-
gation of powers, there was a definite recognition of the
rule that the new power must be limited in such a way that
it is certain to be exercised within the period allowed by the
rule against perpetuities. But if the new power were a
general power presently exercisable, then it could be argued
that it would be valid if it were so limited that it might be
exercised within the period allowed by the rule. However,
this may be questionable in Maryland in view of the re-
stricted construction which the Court of Appeals has ap-
plied to general powers.2 8
22Ibid 483-4. Bracketed material supplied.
2But see Ortman v. Dugan, 130 Md. 121, 100 A. 82 (1917), where the
donor created a trust for his son for life, and after the death of the son for
his issue, with the power in the son's children, upon attaining the age of
twenty-one, to dispose of the property by will or otherwise. There was
also a gift In default and the problem before the Court was the validity of
the gift in default. However, in discussing that problem the court appar-
ently assumed that the power was valid, an assumption which is true only
if the normal rules governing general powers are applied: for, although the
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
APPLICATION OF THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs TO
THE EXERCISE OF A PowER OF APPOINrmENT
Once a power of appointment has been properly created
by the donor, the donee must use care in exercising it to
make certain that he does not violate the rule against per-
petuities. In determining whether the interests created by
the exercise of a power of appointment are valid, the courts
have again made distinctions based on the type of power in-
volved. These distinctions are dependent upon the theory
that a power of appointment is not the same as title to the
property subject to the power, but is a mere authority, or
agency, in the donee; that title to the property subject to
the power remains in the donor prior to the appointment by
the donee; and that the exercise of the power by the donee
is merely an event which causes the title to pass from the
donor to the appointee. These principles find expression in
the "relation back" doctrine by which the courts purport
to read the appointment by the donee back into the instru-
ment creating the power and treat the transfer as if it had
been originally made by the donor.2 4 By using this doctrine
some rather remarkable results have been achieved;25 but
the truth is that the transfer of property through the use
of a power of appointment involves two transactions by two
persons (the creation of the power by the donor and its
exercise by the donee) both of which are necessary to com-
plete the transfer. What the courts do, when they apply
the traditional theory of the operation of powers, is to
ignore the donee's part in the transfer and to stress only
the act of the donor. So long as the results achieved by the
use of the traditional theory are in accord with the general
policies of the law and assist the court in reaching what it
considers a fair and just decision the theory is followed, but
when the theory conflicts with stronger policies of the law
power was so limited that it would vest in the donee within the period
allowed by the rule against perpetuities, it was not certain to be exercised
within that period. The case. therefore, is in accord with the rule that
general powers presently exercisable are valid if so limited that the power
may be exercised within the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities.
5 Am. L. PRop. § §23.2, 23.3; 3 PowELL, §387; SIMES & SMITH, § §911-915.
For example, through the use of a power it was possible to evade pro-
hibitions against devising land, Sir Edward Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17 b, 77
Eng. Rep. 279 (1599) ; to cut off inchoate dower, Ray v. Pung, 5 Madd. 310,
56 Eng. Rep. 914 (1821), 5 B. & Ald. 561. 106 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1822) ; to
authorize married women to transfer property, Armstrong v. Kerns, 61
Md. 364 (1884). See Simes, The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property,
22 Ill. L. Rev. 480 (1928), for a general discussion of the effect of the
"relation back" theory of the operation of powers of appointment on the
transfer of title.
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and its application would achieve a result which the court
does not desire it is abandoned, and we find the court
stressing the act of the donee as an essential and independ-
ent transaction. 0
When the application of the rule against perpetuities is
involved, the courts have usually applied the "relation
back" theory and viewed the appointment by the donee as
if it were a part of the instrument by which the donor
created the power. This, in effect, requires that all interests
created by the donee in the exercise of the power must be
so limited that they are certain to vest within the period
allowed by the rule counting from the time the donor
created the power.2 Applied to testamentary powers, either
general or special, or to special powers, either presently
exercisable or testamentary, this rule seems sound since
in all such cases the creation of the power by the donor has
placed a clog on the title which cannot be removed until
the donee exercises the power; the creation of the power
thus ties up the property within the policy of the rule
against perpetuities. On the other hand when a general
power presently exercisable is involved, the donee stands
in a position which approximates that of an owner; he has
complete control over the property and can transfer good
title at any time so that it is not tied up within the policy
of the rule. Therefore, in determining the validity of in-
terests created by the donee in the exercise of a general
power presently exercisable, the courts have usually com-
puted the period (for the purposes of the requirement of
vesting under the rule against perpetuities) from the time
of the exercise of the power by the donee rather than the
time of its creation by the donor. 8
There is another principle which somewhat modifies the
application of the "relation back" doctrine when applying
- Compare the willingness of the courts to apply the "relation back"
doctrine to achieve the results mentioned in footnote 25, ibid, with their
refusal to apply the theory to assist donees in avoiding the disability of
infancy, Thompson v. Lyon, 20 Mo. 155 (1854), or those trying to cheat
their creditors. Browning v. Blue Grass Hardware Co., 153 Va. 20, 149
S. E. 497 (1929).
26 AM. L. PRoP. §24.34; GRAYx, §§514, 515, 525, 526; 5 POWELL, §788;
SIMES & SMITH, §§1274, 1275; 4 RESTATEMENT (1944) §392. One of the con-
sequences of this rule is that the donee cannot dispose of property subject
to a power to the same extent that he can his own property, and he must,
therefore, be careful, when disposing of both types of property by the same
instrument, not to inadvertently violate the rule against perpetuities,
Albert v. Albert, 68 Md. 352, 12 A. 11 (1888) ; Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou,
321 Mass. 615, 75 N. E. 2d 3 (1947).
"6 AM. L. PRop. §24.33; GRAY, §524; 5 POwELL, §787; SIMES & SMIT,
§1274; 4 RESTATEMENT (1944) §391.
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the rule against perpetuities to powers of appointment. This
is the so-called "second look" doctrine which takes cogni-
zance of the fact that the donee, when he exercises the
power, is acting some time after the donor created it, and
he may, therefore, have knowledge of facts which were not
available to the donor. Thus, in selecting his appointees
and creating his interests, he may act with certainty where-
as the donor could not. The result is that in determining
the validity of the interests created by the donee in the
exercise of the power, the facts existing at the time he exer-
cises the power may be considered although the time period
is computed from the date the donor created the power.29
There are a number of Maryland cases involving testa-
mentary powers, both general and special, in which the
question of the validity of the donees' appointments under
the rule against perpetuities has arisen. In its decisions the
Court of Appeals has recognized and applied the above
stated rules and principles in so far as the problems have
been presented to it. The "relation back" doctrine has
frequently been stated and applied by the Court. For in-
stance, in Thomas v. Gregg,"° the donor left one half of his
estate in trust for the benefit of his daughter, the donee, for
life with a remainder to her issue, subject to certain restric-
tions, and gave a testamentary power to the daughter to
dispose of the property to her children, grandchildren, chil-
dren of her sister, or some descendant of the donor. The
donee by her will appointed the property to "my children
now living, and those that may hereafter be born to me" to
be held in trust during the lifetimes of the children. The
Court in holding the appointment void said:
"It has been always held without question that a
limitation under a power of appointment must be con-
strued as if it were inserted in the instrument creating
the power .... Now, a limitation in Mr. Gregg's will
restraining the alienation of this property for the life
of his daughter, and for the lives of children who might
216 AM. L. PRop. §24.35; GRAY, §523.5; 5 PowmL. §788; SIMEs & SMITH,
§1274; 4 RESTATEMENT (1944) §392. For example, if the donor should
leave property in trust, the income to be paid to the donee during his life-
time, with the power in the donee to appoint the property, by his will,
among his children; the donee might, if none of his children were born after
the trust was created, appoint the property to his children contingent upon
their attaining an age greater than twenty-one although the donor could
not have done so. This Is so because at the time the donor creates the trust
it is possible for the donee to have after born children while at the time
the donee exercises the power the facts establish that there were no after
born children and thus all takers are lives in being.
76 Md. 169, 24 A. 418 (1892),
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be born to her after his death, would extend to a life
then in being and to lives which by possibility might
come into being after his death. In point of fact a child
was born to her after his death; but this circumstance
makes no difference in the application of the rule. It
would be the same if the child had not been born; as it
depends on the question whether a child might by pos-
sibility be born; and not on the fact that it was actually
born. Our conclusion is that the limitation in question
transgresses the rule against perpetuities, and is there-
fore void."" l
In several other cases the Court has stated and applied the
"relation back" doctrine in determining whether the in-
terests created by the exercise of the powers were valid
under the rule against perpetuities 2
In Hawkins v. Ghent8 a husband and wife conveyed
certain property in trust for the wife for life with the power
in the wife to devise the property for the use of her children,
or descendants, and her husband, and if none then a gen-
eral power to devise the property was given the wife, and
in case the powers were not exercised the property was dis-
posed of by a default clause. The wife, in exercise of her
power, devised the property in trust for her children for
their lives and after their death in further trust for a period
of twenty years to pay the income to their children or
descendants, and at the end of the twenty year period to
distribute the property to the children or descendants then
living and if none to other designated persons. The chil-
dren, who were all born after the execution of the trust
deed, claimed the limitations in the will violated the rule
against perpetuities. The Court held the life estates in the
children were valid and refused to pass on the validity of
the other interests since they were contingent and the per-
sons who might ultimately be entitled to them were not
before the Court. In answer to the argument that since the
power was a reserved power and the donor-donee had the
right, under certain circumstances, to revoke the deed of
trust the period of the rule against perpetuities should be
m Ibid 174-5. The holding that the appointment violated the rule against
perpetuities was based on the Barnum case which has since been overruled.
See discussion, supra, circa, pp. 93-94, and footnotes 3 and 4.
8 Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609, 58 A. 36 (1904) ; Reed v.
Mellvain, 113 Md. 140, 77 A. 329 (1910) ; Levenson v. Manly, 119 Md. 517,
87 A. 261 (1913) ; Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563. 89 A. 1094 (1914);
Hawkins v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 A. 212 (1928) ; Lamkin v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 192 Md. 472, 64 A. 2d 704 (1949).
Supra, n. 32.
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determined from the time of the exercise of the power
rather than from the date the power was created, the Court
said:
"We shall .. .not express at this time an opinion as
to whether, with respect to the application of the rule
against perpetuities, the execution of the testamentary
power conferred by the deed of trust may be referred
to the time when the donee's will took effect, rather
than to the date of the deed, in view of the fact that
the donee was also the donor of the power, and that
the deed authorized her to revoke the trust under cer-
tain conditions. For the purposes of this decision we
have treated the execution of the power as being re-
ferable to the date of the deed, but we have not in-
tended to foreclose the question whether it may prop-
erly be referred to the later period suggested in the
argument. The present life estates are valid upon either
of those theories. '34
Since the powers involved were testamentary it is doubt-
ful whether the fact they were reserved powers should
make any difference, but if a general power presently
exercisable were reserved by the donor, then he would be
in a position approximating that of an owner of the prop-
erty subject to the power, and, for the purposes of the re-
quirement of vesting under the rule against perpetuities,
the Court of Appeals might compute the period from the
time the power was exercised rather than from the date of
its creation. 5 Also if the donor-donee has an unrestricted
right to revoke the trust, the Court might in determining
the validity of the appointed interests compute the period
of the rule from the time of the exercise of the power rather
than its creation."
Hawkins v. Ghent, supra, n. 32, 266.
85This is the general rule and it would seem applicable, even In Mary-
land, under a reserved power since the Court of Appeals has Indicated that
in such cases the donor-donee has the authority to appoint the property to
his creditors and thus, presumably, also to himself or his estate or the
creditors of his estate. Wyeth v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 176 Md. 369,
4 A. 2d 753 (1939), noted 4 Md. L. Rev. 297 (1940). The position of the
donor-donee, in such cases, approximates that of an owner of the property
subject to the power, and therefore, In determining the validity of the in-
terests created by the donee in exercise of the power the rule against per-
petuities should be applied as of the time the appointment is made.
*GaAY, §524.1; 4 RESTATHMENT (1944) §373. See Ryan v. Ward, 192
Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258 (1949), where the Court of Appeals considered this
problem and indicated its accord with the proposition that where the settlor
of a trust has the absolute power to revoke the trust during his lifetime,
the validity of interests created under the trust are to be determined, for
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Several Maryland cases have applied the "second look"
doctrine and thereby upheld limitations which otherwise
would have been invalid under the "relation back" prin-
ciple. In the early case of Albert v. Albert 7 the donor left
property in trust for his son, the donee, for life with a re-
mainder to the children of the son, subject to the power of
the son to appoint the remainder, by his will, in such shares
and amounts or proportions as he wished, including the
power to create trusts. The son left a will in which he dis-
posed of his own property and the property subject to the
power by blending them together and dividing the total
into shares, giving some of the shares outright and some
in trust to each of his children; other shares were given in
trust for his grandchildren, and there were also limitations
in favor of the wives of his sons and the children of his
grandchildren. In determining the validity of the appoint-
ments made by the son, the Court considered each gift
separately since they were made to individuals and not to
a class. The Court also took account of the facts at the
time the appointments were made, the "second look" doc-
trine, and noted that as all of the son's children were born
before the death of the donor, the life estates to them and
the remainders following them were valid. And since some
of the grandchildren, to whom gifts had been made on
condition they attain the age of majority, were certain to
reach that age within twenty-one years from the death of
the donee, the gifts to them were sustained. The Court
also stated that if the wives of the sons were born before
the death of the donor the limitations to them would be
valid, but that the gifts to the grandchildren born after
the death of the donor and the remainders over following
their deaths were invalid.3 In addition to the excellent
opinion in the Albert case, the Court of Appeals has also
recognized and applied the "second look" doctrine in the
cases of Graham v. Whitridge"9 and Lamkin v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co.40
the purposes of the rule against perpetuities, as of the time of the death of
the settlor rather than the date of the execution of the trust; but the Court
refused to apply the rule to the case before them because the settlor in that
case had only a limited power to revoke the trust.
68 Md. 352, 12 A. 11 (1888).
"Here again the invalidity of the life estate in the grandchildren is based
on the former Maryland rule of the Barnum case. See discussion, supra,
pp. 93-94, and footnotes 3 and 4.
"99 Md. 248, 57 A. 609, 58 A. 36 (1904).
40192 Md. 472, 64 A. 2d 704 (1949).
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APPLICATION OF THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETurnTs TO
GIFTS IN DEFAULT OF APPOINTmFNT
When the donor creates a power of appointment, he
should, and usually does, make provision for the disposition
of the property subject to the power in case the donee fails
to make an appointment. Since the interest of the donee is
normally a life estate, the gift in default, if it takes effect
at all, will do so at the death of the donee which is within
the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities from
the time the donor created the power. However, if the gift
in default should be contingent upon the happening of an
event which is beyond the time allowed by rule, the gift, of
course, would be void."' On the other hand, even though
the gift itself will take effect within the time allowed by
the rule against perpetuities, the donor in disposing of the
property may attempt to create interests which will not
vest within the period allowed by the rule; in such case the
interests are void. In determining whether the interests
created by the default clause violate the rule against per-
petuities, the type of power given to the donee and the facts
existing at the time the power expires may be important just
as they are in cases where the donee exercises the power.
If the donee has a general power presently exercisable, the
property subject to the power has not in fact been tied up
during the existence of the power; therefore, the validity
of the gift in default (the result of the non-exercise of the
power) like the validity of the interests created by the
exercise of the power should be determined as of the time
the power expires (normally the death of the donee).42
This means that the interests created by the default clause
are valid provided they vest within the period allowed by
the rule against perpetuities counting from the time the
power expires. On the other hand if the power is a special
power, even though it is presently exercisable, or a testa-
mentary power, either general or special, the mere exist-
"This Is likely to be the case where the power itself is created in such
a way that It violates the rule against perpetuities, - that Is, where it Is
not certain to be exercised within the period allowed by the rule; however,
such interests are not, strictly speaking, created by a gift in default of
appointment.
"The justification for this approach is that in fact the property has not
been tied up within the policy of the rule against perpetuities during the
lifetime of the donee, and is not exercising the power the donee is choosing
to allow the property to pass under the default clause rather 'than exercise
the power; therefore, the validity of the disposition which he is in effect
making should be governed by the test which would have applied if he had
exercised the power and made an identical disposition. This position,
however, is not beyond question; see the authorities cited n. 43, infra.
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ence of the power constitutes a clog on the title to the prop-
erty subject to it, and interests created by the gift in
default, like the interests created by the exercise of such a
power, must vest within the period allowed by the rule
against perpetuities counting from the time the power was
created; but since the failure of the donee to exercise the
power occurs some time after the creation of the power, it
is proper for the court, in determining the validity of the
gift in default under the rule against perpetuities, to take
note of the facts existing at the time the power expires.48
There are a number of Maryland cases in which the
Court of Appeals has upheld a gift in default where the
attempted appointment failed." In each instance all the
interests created by the gift in default vested within the
period allowed by the rule against perpetuities counting
from the time the donor created the power, although in
none of the cases did the Court expressly discuss the prob-
lem of the rule against perpetuities. In one case, Ortman v.
Dugan,4" a gift in default of appointment was held invalid;
in that case the donor placed property in trust for her son
for life, remainder to his issue with the power in his chil-
dren to dispose of the property by will upon attaining the
age of twenty-one, and in default of any such disposition, or
if the children should die without leaving issue, to her
daughter for life, remainder to her issue. The son died
without leaving any issue surviving him and the daughter
and her issue attempted to convey the property; the ques-
tion before the Court, therefore, was the validity of the gift
in default. The Court held the gift void as a violation of
the rule against perpetuities because the son might have
,3 This is a special application of the "second look" principle and seems
proper in view of the fact the donee himself could make a similar appoint-
ment which would be valid; it is an extension of the "second look" principle
into what has been termed the "wait and see" doctrine. There is. as yet,
not much authority for this new approach outside of certain recent statutory
enactments, and the text writers and law review commentators are in dis-
agreement as to the desirability of adopting the doctrine. Of. 6 AM. L. PROP.
§24.36; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the
Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L. Q. Rev. 35 (1952) ; Leach, Perpetuities
Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 (1954); Leach,
Perpetuities Reform by Legislation, 70 L. Q. Rev. 478 (1954); with 5
POWELL, §§765, 788; SiMEs & SMiTr, §§1230, 1276; Simes, Is the Rule
Against Perpetuities DoomedF The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 Mich. L.
Rev. 179 (1953). In the only case dealing with the problem, the Massa-
chusetts court applied the doctrine. Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340. 108
N. E; 2d 563 (1952).
" For example Albert v. Albert, 68 Md. 352, 12 A. 11 (1888) ; Reed v.
McIlvain, 113 Md. 140, 77 A. 329 (1910) ; Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563,
89 A. 1094 (1914); Hughes v. McDaniel, 202 Md. 636, 98 A. 2d 6 (1953).
-"130 Md. 121, 100 A. 82 (1917).
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had children who could have survived him for more than
twenty-one years, and thus the exercise of the power, or
the gift in default thereof, might not occur within a life
in being and twenty-one years from the time the donor
created the power. However, the facts established that the
only children of the son had died prior to the execution of
the will by the donor; consequently, at the time the power
expired and the gift in default took effect, it was clear that
there was no violation of the rule against perpetuities.
Under the principles stated above the gift could have been
upheld, but the Court of Appeals did not consider the appli-
cation of the "second look" approach. Until the problem
has been directly presented to the Court and it has either
accepted or rejected the principle, it is impossible to tell
whether the Court will apply the "second look" doctrine to
gifts in default. Certainly the decision in the Ortman case
should not be construed as a rejection of the principle in
such cases.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary it may be stated that the Court of Appeals,
in applying the rule against perpetuities to powers of
appointment, has in general followed well settled and
orthodox rules. In the case of testamentary powers, both
general and special, the donor in creating the power must
limit it in such a way that it is certain to be exercised
within the period allowed by the rule from the time the
instrument creating the power takes effect. The same rule
is applicable to special powers presently exercisable. In
the case of general powers presently exercisable the rule
may be otherwise; courts usually uphold such powers if
they are limited in such a way that they may be exercised
within the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities
counting from the date of the instrument creating the
power. This is true because such a power approximates
ownership, and the donee of such a power is in -the position
of an owner of the property subject to the power; once he
has acquired the right to exercise the power the property
is no longer tied up within the policy of the rule against
perpetuities. However, as has been indicated, in Maryland
a general power is in a sense a limited power in -that the
donee cannot appoint the property to himself, his creditors,
his estate, or the creditors of his estate and his position,
therefore, does not quite approximate that of an owner.
But in allowing the donee of a general power to create
new powers when making an appointment, the Court of
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Appeals applied the usual rule governing general powers
and ignored the fact that a general power in Maryland is
a limited power, and there are some dicta in the Maryland
cases which indicate that the Court may distinguish be-
tween general and special powers in applying the rule
against perpetuities. It is, therefore, at present impossible
to say whether the fact that the power is a general power
presently exercisable is of any importance in determining
the validity of the power under the rule against perpetui-
ties. However, if the power expressly authorizes appoint-
ments to the donee, his creditors, his estate, or the creditors
of his estate there is no reason for not applying the normal
rule; also if the power is reserved by the donor in creating a
living trust, it would seem that the usual rule should apply.
With regard to the validity of the interests created by
the donee in the exercise of powers of appointment, the
Court of Appeals has applied the normal rules in so far as
the problems have been presented to it. Again the cases
all involve testamentary powers, both general and special,
and the rule requiring the interests to vest within the
period allowed by the rule against perpetuities, counting
from the time the power was created by the donor rather
than the time of its exercise by the donee, is the same as
that applied by other courts. The same rule is usually
applied to special powers presently exercisable and there
seems no reason to doubt it will also be applied in Mary-
land. The only question is with respect to the rule to be
applied to general powers presently exercisable. The an-
swer to that problem depends on whether a general power
in Maryland is to be treated as a limited power, and since
that question has not yet been answered it is impossible to
say whether a different rule will be applied in such cases.
However, as previously suggested, if the power expressly
gives the donee the authority to appoint to himself, his
creditors, his estate, or the creditors of his estate, or if it is
a reserved power, there is no reason to doubt the applica-
tion of the normal rules.
In determining the validity of gifts in default of appoint-
ment, under the rule against perpetuities, the following
principles should be applied: (1) If the gift in default is
contingent upon the happening of an event which is beyond
the time allowed by the rule, counting from the creation
of the power, the gift is void. (2) When the gift in default
follows a general power presently exercisable, the validity
of the interests created therein is determined as of the time
the power expires. (3) Gifts in default following special
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powers presently exercisable or testamentary powers,
either general or special, are valid providing the interests
vest within the period allowed by the rule counting from
the time the power was created; but in determining whether
the interests vest within the period allowed by the rule, the
facts existing at the expiration of the power may be con-
sidered. Here, as in other problems involving powers of
appointment in Maryland, the results will depend upon
how the Court of Appeals classifies general powers when
applying the rule against perpetuities and whether the
"second look" doctrine is applied to gifts in default.
If the Court of Appeals, in applying the rule against
perpetuities to powers of appointment, should treat general
powers as limited powers and apply the rules applicable
to special powers, it will have the effect of restricting both
the donor in creating such powers and the donee in exer-
cising them.4" This restriction may, as has been indicated,
be largely overcome by careful draftsmanship when the
power is created. Until this matter is settled, the law of
powers of appointment in Maryland will remain uncertain
and to some extent inconsistent.
In the opinion of the writer the Court of Appeals should not treat
general powers as limited powers when applying the rule against per-
petuities. Although the interpretation applied by the Court to general
powers has somewhat restricted the donee in disposing of the property
subject to the power, and also the creditors of the donee in reaching such
property, the restrictions are slight and do not in fact seriously interfere
with the donee's power of disposition. The donee of a general power pres-
ently exercisable is for all practical purposes in the position of an owner
and the normal rules governing such powers should be applied by the Court.
Furthermore, the reason given by the Court for restricting the donee of a
general power in disposing of the property is unsound and does not justify
the Court's position. (The only reason the Court has given for restricting
the donee is that the property subject to the power is the property of the
donor and not of the donee. But this proves too much; it would bar the
donee from making any disposition! The answer to the Court's argument
is that the donee may dispose of the property because the donor gave him
authority to do so, and the authority is unlimited.) Since the restriction
is based on an error there is no reason why the Court should continue to
perpetuate and expand that error. Furthermore, the situations in which
the restriction might make a difference are very few and only involve
general powers presently exercisable. Since all these difficulties may be
avoided by the Court applying the usual rules where general powers pres-
ently exercisable are Involved, it is to be hoped that they will do so; in fact
it would seem desirable for the Court to abandon entirely their restricted
interpretation of general powers.
